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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The following are parties to the proceedings: 
1. Petitioner/ Appellant Jayni Searle; 
2. Respondent/Appellee Boyd Searle; 
3. Other persons and entities mentioned are the Fort Peck Assiniboine and 
Sioux Tribe and its counsel Gary Beaudry, whom are not parties in the Third 
District Court case. These persons and entities participated in the proceedings 
before the Third District Juvenile Court and the Fort Peck Tribal Court. While 
Appellant makes references to them in her brief and serves copies of the brief 
upon Mr. Beaudry, Appellee does not include them because they did not 
intervene in the Third District Court case. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final 
order of the Third District Court involving domestication and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment. Appellant misstates the Court's jurisdiction in her 
Jurisdictional Statement asserting that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
"pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure/7 (Appellant's Brief, 1). That subsection of the statute deals 
exclusively with jurisdiction over final orders or decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of those agencies. This appeal does not deal 
with an adjudicative proceeding. 
There is no dispute that this matter concerns the enforceability of a foreign 
judgment. The Utah Supreme Court would have had jurisdiction over this 
matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) had the appeal been timely filed in 
the Supreme Court. Consequently, this appeal is improperly filed in the wrong 
court and must be dismissed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee disagrees with Appellant's characterization of the nature of the 
issues presented for review. More particularly, Appellant erroneously 
designates factual issues as legal issues and thereby purports to apply an 
incorrect standard of review. Appellee will hereinafter recite the issues which 
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Appellant presents for review noting Appellee's position as to the nature of the 
issue and the appropriate standard of review. 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the Writ of 
Assistance did not comply with the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act? 
Appellant agrees that this issue presents a question of law. Conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
App. 1991); Pendeleton v. Pendeleton, 918 P.2d 159,160 (Utah App. 1996); Smith v. 
Smith 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990) (hereinafter "Standard of Review"). In 
determining the correctness of the trial court's determination, the Appellate 
Court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law. State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
Appellant disagrees that Marguiles By and Through Marguiles v. Upchurch, 696 
P.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (Utah 1985) supports the designation of this issue as a 
question of law as the case provides no support for the designation. 
2. Did the trial court err when it determined that the Tribal 
Court's May 22, 1998 Order, which Transferred custody, 
lacked due process with respect to Appellee? 
Appellant disagrees with the designation of this issue as a question of law. 
This issue involves mixed questions of fact and law. Findings of Fact are 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and will not be set aside unless 
they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342, (Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Utah App. 
2 
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1999); Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. (hereinafter "Standard of Review"). 
Conclusions of law are subject to the standard of review stated with respect to 
the first issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The legal authorities that are determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal include: 
Constitutional Provisions: 
U.S. Const, Amend. 5,14 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 24 
Statutory Provisions: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l et seq. (1998) 
Rules of Procedure: 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In addressing the issues raised by the Appeal, Respondent/Appellee, 
Boyd Searle, will be referred to as "the grandfather" and Petitioner/Appellant, 
Jayni Searle will be referred to as "the mother." 
3 
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A. Nature of Case. 
This case concerns the enforceability of a foreign judgment entered by the 
Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court (hereinafter "the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court") located on an Indian Reservation in Poplar, Montana. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
In February 1998, the grandfather filed in the Third District Juvenile Court 
(hereinafter "the Juvenile Court") a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of 
the mother in relation her minor child. (R. 454). The Juvenile Court granted 
temporary custody of the child to the grandfather on March 3, 1998. (R. 454). 
The mother filed in he Juvenile Court a Petition to Transfer to the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court. The Juvenile Court transferred jurisdiction over the pending 
Petition to Terminate Parental Rights to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. (R. 454). On 
May 22, 1998, the Tribal Court issued an ex-parte order accepting jurisdiction 
and transferring custody of the minor child to the mother. (R. 454). On May 28, 
1998 the mother filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with the Third District 
Court, (hereinafter "the trial court") Judge Timothy R. Hanson, presiding, 
seeking enforcement of the May 22,1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order. 
(R. 1, 454). The mother later filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Assistance. 
(R. 103-104). The mother filed a Notice to Submit requesting the trial court rule 
on the pleadings. (R. 28-29). The grandfather filed an objection and requested a 
hearing. (R. 151-183). On March 8,1999, the trial court convened a hearing and 
dismissed the Petition for Writ of Assistance on grounds that the action was not 
4 
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properly filed under the Foreign Judgment Act and the Tribal Court order is not 
entitled to full faith and credit because the grandfather's due process rights were 
violated. (R. 334; 453-457). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This matter 
involves an appeal of a final order of the Third District Court involving 
domestication and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The Court of Appeals 
does not have jurisdiction over this matter. The Utah Supreme Court would 
have had jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 had 
the appeal been timely filed in the Supreme Court. 
II. 
The mother's brief should be stricken and the appeal dismissed for 
noncompliance with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by 
failing to cite to the record showing preservation in the trial court of each issue 
presented for review. 
III. 
The mother's brief contains factual allegations that should be stricken for 
failure to cite where they are supported in the record. 
IV. 
The mother's Writ of Assistance, by its very language, required 
compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act. The record is replete with 
5 
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admissions that she did not comply with the statutory filing requirements and 
even conceded that the trial court's determination that the Foreign Judgment Act 
applied was correct. The issues related to the Foreign Judgment Act were not 
preserved for appellate review as a consequence of her admissions on the record. 
Moreover, the appeal of this issue is frivolous because the mother admits in her 
brief that the Foreign Judgment Act was not the vehicle for the enforcement she 
sought, yet she appeals the trial court's refusal to issue a writ containing 
language that it was issued pursuant to the Foreign Judgment Act. 
V. 
The trial court's determination that due process was violated in relation to 
the Tribal Court order hinges on the factual finding that the grandfather was not 
provided any notice of a hearing or that there would be a ruling on custody. 
This is a mixed question of fact and law rather than a simply question of law as 
proposed by the mother. The mother's challenge of factual findings should be 
disregarded because of her failure to marshal the evidence and demonstrate the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Even if the mother had 
marshaled the evidence, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding 
of lack of notice. In the absence of notice, the right to due process has been 
violated. The appeal is frivolous because the record is replete with the mother's 
admissions that due process requires notice and that the grandfather was not 
given notice. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION. 
The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final 
order of the Third District Court involving domestication and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment. The mother misstates the Court's jurisdiction in her 
Jurisdictional Statement asserting that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
"pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure." (Appellant's Brief, 1). That subsection of the statute deals 
exclusively with jurisdiction over final orders or decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the those agencies. This appeal does not 
deal with an adjudicative proceeding. Further, Rule 3 confers no jurisdiction on 
a specific appellate court but provides the procedure by which the notice of 
appeal allows the appropriate court to take jurisdiction. 
It is undisputed that this matter concerns the enforceability of a foreign 
judgment. The trial court found the action was one to domestic a foreign 
judgment, the court clerk designated the action a "special matter," and the 
mother characterizes her petition as "An Action...to enforce a May 22, 1998 
Order from the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court." (T. 31; R. 9,11; 
Appellants' Brief, 3), The Utah Supreme Court would have had jurisdiction 
over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), because it involves an order 
7 
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over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction, 
had the appeal been timely filed in the Supreme Court. 
However, the Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction over an appeal, 
which is not timely brought before it, and an untimely appeal will be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983). 
The thirty day period within which this matter could have been appealed to the 
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure has 
expired. Consequently, this appeal is improperly filed in the wrong court and 
must be dismissed. 
II. THE MOTHER'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN FOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(a)(5). 
The mother's brief should be stricken and the appeal dismissed for 
noncompliance with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by 
failing to cite to the record showing preservation in the trial court of each issue 
presented for review. The rule expressly mandates: 
(a) Brief of appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain 
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for 
each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting 
authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Emphasis added.) 
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The mother's brief contains a statement of the issues presented for review, 
but does not provide citations to the record demonstrating they were preserved 
in the trial court or allege alternative grounds for seeking review of issues not 
preserved. The clear language of the rule makes it mandatory. Neither the 
Appellate Court nor the opposing party should bear the burden of fleshing out 
the record to determine the issues were properly raised and litigated or that 
timely objections and motions were made as required. State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 
819, 120-21 (Utah 1989) (specific and timely objections must be made before the 
lower court and then identified for the appellate court.). Consequently, the 
mother's brief is defective and should be stricken. 
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTHER'S BRIEF 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN FOR LACK OF CITATION OR SUPPORT IN THE 
RECORD. 
The mother's brief contains factual allegations that should be stricken for 
failure to cite support in the record. Facts that should be stricken are found in 
pages 21 through 24, where factual allegations are made regarding a June 8,1998 
telephonic hearing involving both the Juvenile Court and the Tribal Court. 
Specifically, these pages make reference to a hearing cited in the mother's 
"Statement of the Case/Facts/7 (Appellant's Brief, 5-6). Those earlier citations 
are to a document stating, "On June 8th, 1998, the tribal court and juvenile courts 
issues [sic] stays of the proceedings pending hearing before an appeals or federal 
court on the issue of whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to enter such 
an order/7 (R. 328). Nothing more is revealed in that citation regarding the 
9 
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purpose of the hearing, the substance of the issues addressed, or any other fact 
regarding what occurred at said hearing. 
Notwithstanding the absence of additional facts, the mother's brief later 
expands on those meager references in the record and purports that 
a) the grandfather "had a fair opportunity to object and fight 
the issues raised by the order at the June 8,1998 hearing;" 
b) the grandfather "was able to present his arguments;" 
c) the grandfather "had nearly a four month window in which 
to file pleadings before the Tribal Court to seek custody;" 
Contrary to these unsupported factual allegations, the transcript contains 
argument that these things did not occur, but rather the grandfather was told he 
had no right to object to the lack of notice because he had no right to due process 
in the Tribal Court. The transcript indicates the grandfather was told that he 
already had his due process in the state court and the Tribal Court would do as it 
pleased. (T. 24). There is absolutely no record supporting the factual assertion 
that the grandfather was given a hearing during the telephonic conference on the 
lack of notice prior to entry of the Tribal Court's May 22,1998 order, or that he 
was given the opportunity to present his arguments regarding the transfer of 
custody. The only references in the record state otherwise—that the door was 
closed when the Tribal Court rejected the principle that the grandfather had due 
process rights in the Tribal Court in the first instance. 
10 
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Regardless of the mother's position on those facts, there is no record 
indicating that the grandfather was given any kind of hearing to review whether 
the circumstances in the Tribal Court amounted to due process. There is no 
notice of hearing, no minute entry or transcript of the hearing supporting the 
mother's contentions. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Uckerman v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co. refused 
to consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record. 588 P.2d 
142 (Utah 1978). Consequently, facts contained in pages 21 through 24 in the 
mother's brief should be stricken and not considered. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE MOTHER DID 
NOT COMPLY WITH THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT AND THAT 
COMPLIANCE WAS A PREREQUISITE TO ISSUING THE WRIT OF 
ASSISTANCE. 
The Foreign Judgment Act deals with three pertinent issues: the filing and 
commencing of an action on a foreign judgment; the foreign judgment debtor's 
right to a stay; and the foreign judgment creditor's right to a lien. Because this 
matter relates to a child rather than a money judgment, the only relevant issue is 
the filing requirements: 
"(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at the time 
of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with the clerk of 
the district court stating the last known post-office address of the 
judgment debtor and the judgment creditor. 
"(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the clerk of 
the district court shall notify the judgment debtor that the judgment 
has been filed. Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the 
affidavit. The clerk shall record the date the notice is mailed in the 
register of actions." 
11 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3(l)&(2) (Emphasis added) (Addendum, 1). 
The trial court ruled the Fort Peck Tribal Court's Order is a foreign 
judgment that must be filed under the Foreign Judgment Act and the mother did 
not comply with the statute by simply filing a Petition for Writ of Assistance: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The May 22,1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court 
transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign 
judgment. 
2. As a foreign judgment, the judgment must be filed in 
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22a-l, et seq. 
3. The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply 
with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
(Conclusions f 1-3; R. 453-457; Addendum, 2-5). 
The trial court's ruling is a conclusion of law subject to the correctness 
Standard of Review. Howell 806 P.2d at 1211; Pendeleton, 918 P.2d at 160; Smith, 
793 P.2d at 409. In determining the correctness of the trial court's determination, 
the Appellate Court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree 
to the trial judge's determination of law. Vena, 869 P.2d at 935. 
A. Noncompliance with the filing requirements of the 
Foreign Judgment Act constitutes noncompliance with the 
statute. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Writ of Assistance did not 
comply with the Foreign Judgment Act because the mother conceded 
noncompliance with the filing provisions of the statute. (Appellant's Brief, 12-
12 
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13). The question answers itself in the mother's brief, although she attempts to 
argue a different issue than the one presented for review. The mother frames the 
first issue presented for review as, "T)id the trial court err in concluding that the 
Writ of Assistance did not comply with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act?" She 
then concedes she did not abide by the statute's filing requirements but proceeds 
to argue a different issue, namely that there are alternative ways to enforce a 
judgment and that noncompliance with the provisions of the statute should not 
have resulted in dismissal of the Writ of Assistance. (Appellant's Brief, 10-13). 
The mother's arguments in regard to alternative ways to enforce a foreign 
judgment should be disregarded because it is not the issue presented for review 
and does not affect the determination of whether the court erred in concluding 
that the manner in which the Writ of Assistance was filed did not comply with 
the statutory provisions of the Foreign Judgment Act. 
Even if the Appellate Court were inclined to reach an issue not specifically 
presented for review, the mother did not preserve for appellate review the issue 
of alternatives other than the Foreign Judgment Act. An issue is preserved for 
appellate review when three requirements are satisfied: i) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion; ii) the issue must be specifically raised; and iii) a party 
must introduce supporting evidence or provide relevant legal authority. Hart v. 
Salt lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The three 
requirements are intended to "put the judge on notice of the asserted error and 
allow [ ] the opportunity for correction at the time in the course of the 
13 
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proceeding/' Borberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
rational for preservation of issues is that the trial court, in fairness, ought to have 
the chance to correct its own errors. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1225-26,1227 
(Utah 1998). 
Contrary to this standard, the mother expressed through counsel to the 
trial court that she "wasn't sure whether the Foreign Judgment applied or not," 
to which the trial court respond, "of course it applies." (T. 21). She further 
conceded she "wasn't sure whether it applied just to sister states or to all foreign 
judgments," and that she "wasn't sure which was the proper way," that she 
"allowed the Court to determine that" and that the trial court "probably 
determined it correctly." (T. 21-22). By conceding that she left it for the trial 
court to determine whether the statute applied because she did not know and 
conceding that the trial court probably determined it correctly, she failed to 
provide the trial court relevant legal authority or the requisite opportunity to 
correct the alleged error. Consequently, the issue was not preserved and is 
improper for appellate review. 
The mother's admission that she did not file the action in accordance to 
the procedures set forth in the Foreign Judgment Act amounts to an admission 
that there was no compliance with the statute. She unabashedly admits that she 
did not file an affidavit stating the last known address of the grandfather. 
Instead she opted for filling out the civil action cover sheet and including the 
grandfather's last known address. (Appellant's Brief, 12-13). She further admits 
14 
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that the clerk of the district court did not send notice to the grandfather's address 
or record the date in the register of actions. Instead she opted for mailing notice 
herself to the grandfather's attorney. (Appellant's Brief, 12). She argues this 
should be good enough. 
Inasmuch as the mother admits in her brief that the mandatory statutory 
provisions were not adhered, the Appellate Court should accept her answer that 
she did not comply with the statute and should disregard further argument once 
the issue she presents for review, "did the writ comply with ilie statute?/' has been 
determined. 
B. The appeal of the trial court's denial of the Writ of 
Assistance is frivolous because there is no dispute that the 
requirements of the Foreign Judgment Act were not 
adhered. 
The mother's brief fails to mention that this appeal is based on the trial 
court's denial of a request for entry of an "Amended Writ of Assistance" 
containing the following language: 
"The Court hereby concludes that, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 
1911(d) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l et seq., the order of the 
tribal court is properly before the court for domestication. Based 
upon this conclusion, the Court hereby recognizes the Order of the 
Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court, gives it full faith and 
credit, and domesticates the order. Based upon good cause 
appearing in the record before the Court and in Plaintiff's Petition 
for Writ of Assistance, the Court hereby orders that the Sheriff, Law 
Enforcement, or Constable to use any and all necessary and 
reasonable means to secure the person of Chad Searle and deliver 
him to Jim C. Shirley at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, 
Utah for delivery to the natural mother. Any and all necessary and 
reasonable means shall include, but not limited to, entrance upon 
the premises located at; (1) the residence at 4885 South 3640 West, 
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Kearns, Utah; (2) the residence at 4906 South 4460 West, Kearns, 
Utah; or (3) Arcadia Elementary at 3461 West 4850 South, Kearns, 
Utah and execute upon the attached Order/7 (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 103-104; Addendum, 6-7) 
Despite the writ's reliance oi L 1 he I ?oreigi i Ji idgn lei i,1 • \,cl (i e [ Jtah Code 
A i n i § 78-22; t 1 < >t si >q.) the mother raises the two arguments discussed supra 
challenging the trial court's decision not to issue the writ m grounds that she did 
not compl> with the provisions of the Foreign judgnu • ^ 
tl lere are alternate e means of en forcement besides the Foreign Judgment Act, 
and, b) that she substantially complied n the Foreign Judgment Act's 
provisions. (Appellant's Brief, 10-13). 
• Fituii in114»» mofliet <- JIji^ uiiM'iiii I'h.ii iln'iv are alteniitiyes to Mv hnvign. 
Judgment Act is irrelevant because the Writ of Assistance she sought specifically 
requested a finding that "pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-22a-l et seq, the 
order of the Inbal court is properly before the IOIJI! lor <l< -niesth alion "Stu did 
i w\ M I 4 iiiii i I'JIti" "iLilniy; "thai tin totvign order was domesticated by some 
alternative procedure but that it was properly domesticated under the Foreign 
Judgment Act or Utah i ode Ann, fc /'8-J2a-l ei, .sr</ J he trial court had nu choice 
Inn inn Ii'ir, iht- hiil heiausf" tin "attemaf i\ es. a TI incongruous with the 
language of the writ citing compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act. 
Second, despite the mother's argument that she "substantially complied77 
hit!) Hit hueiejni (ud^nnent AM, Ilia !Vt]|iii!Viiienih ol Hie statute related hi the 
manner in which an action is filed, which she did not follow. Her failure to make 
16 
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the designation on the civil cover sheet, her failure to file an affidavit, and the 
clerk's subsequent failure to send notice to the grandfather and record the notice 
in the register of actions circumvents the very heart of the statute. (R. 9; 
Appellant's Brief, 12-13). 
Most importantly, the appeal of this issue is frivolous under Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as demonstrated by the following statement 
contained in the mother's brief, "As argued above, the Foreign Judgment Act 
was not the vehicle for enforcement/7 (Appellant's Brief, 13). In essence, the 
mother argues the trial court committed error in denying the writ for 
noncompliance with the statute because she did not seek enforcement under the 
Foreign Judgment Act. The argument is not grounded in fact because the 
language of her own writ reveals she sought enforcement under the statute. 
Therefore, the mother's insistence that the Appellate Court determine the trial 
court should issue a writ containing language that the foreign order was properly 
domesticated pursuant to the Foreign Judgment Act when she admits employing 
alternative procedures and claims the Foreign Judgment Act was not the vehicle for 
enforcement renders the appeal frivolous because it is not grounded in fact or 
warranted by existing law. The Appellate Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling and sanction the mother in the amount of attorneys fees and costs 
incurred by the grandfather in connection with responding to this frivolous 
appeal. 
17 
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v T H E T R I A L C O U R T , s K U L I N G j H A j D U £ PROCESS WAS 
VIOLATED CANNOT BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT HINGES ON A 
FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE GRANDFATHER WAS NOT GIVEN 
NOTICE AND THE MOTHER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
TO DEMONSTRATE CLEAR ERROR. 
The trial co i irt s i i llii ig regardii ig tl le cii le pi ocess Issue as contained in the 
Order of Dismissal states: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
4. The Third District juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. 
Johansson, presiding, transferred jurisdiction over a pending 
Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
. 5. The Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted jurisdiction and 
transferred custody of the minor child on May 22,1998. 
6. Boyd Searle was not provided notice that the > t 
Peck I ribal Court would issue an Order on the issue of custody. 
7. • Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with 
this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May 22, 
1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody order. 
; ( ON< I ti'SIONSt M I A W 
4. Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior 
to the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5 The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be 
heard at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a 
violation of respondent's due process rights. 
6. As such, the May 22,1998 Order transferring custody 
is not entitled to full faith and credit.... 
(Findings f 4-7; Conclusions f 4-6; R. 453-457; Addendum, 2-5). 
1 'he trial court s legal conch isioi i that cit le proc sss v as \ violated hinges on 
a factual finding that the grandfather was not given notice of a hearing or that 
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there would be a ruling on custody. Findings of Fact are subject to the clearly 
erroneous Standard of Review and will not be set aside unless they are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young, 979 P.2d at 
342 (Utah 1999); Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937 (Utah 1998); Johnson, 977 P.2d at 
1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness. Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211; 
Pendeleton, 918 P.2d at 160; Smith, 793 P.2d at 409. In determining the correctness 
of the trial court's determination, the Appellate Court decides the matter for itself 
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. Pena, 
869 P.2d at 935. 
A. Because the trial court found there was no notice and 
concluded Due Process was therefore violated, the 
Standard of Review is a mixed standard of clear error on 
the facts and correctness on the legal significance of the 
facts. 
The mother's second issue asks, "Did the trial court err when it 
determined that the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order, which transferred 
custody, lacked due process with respect to Appellee?" As discussed supra, this 
is a mixed question of fact and law rather than simply a question of law as 
proposed by the mother. As such, the mother must marshal the evidence to 
challenge the factual findings. The mother's brief is defective because of her 
failure to marshal the evidence and should be disregarded on this issue. 
B. Failure to marshal the evidence obligates the Appellate 
Court to assume the findings are correct. 
19 
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Appi'lltiU1 i (UJils w ill mi if address challenges to factual findings unless the 
appellant has properly marshaled the evidence. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 
433-34 (Utah 1998). Marshalling the evidence entails listing ai; n.,- e\ lacnce 
supporting the cl lallenged fii idii ig. 3 ingey v Chnslettsen -- (I Jtaii 1 999). Io 
s j l o w that the factual finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insunn u- t tc • s i ippoi t 1:1 i.e fii tdings e\ en 
in viewiinj' ill in tin' lighl most favorable to the court below/' Pennington, 973 
P.2d at 937 (Utah 1998); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989). 'To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, i 
appellai i;t n in ist i i tarsi lal tl i.e e < ddei ice in: i si lpp :)i t • :: f tl: te findings a men 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support a* : "v 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 
'clearly erroneous ' i ala tree v. Fitzgerah f, 961 P 2( 1:3135 31 2(1 Jtal i/l 998). 
The mother's brief vacillates between challenging the trial court's finding 
that there was no notice, admitting there was no notice, arguing lack of notice 
was curet- :n .. jbsequent hearing, complaining llio evulniu" not 
nmsidered .mil iv*|iH»slmg the Appellate Court "remand so that the District 
Court can make a determination based upon all the evidence." (Appellant's 
Brief, 21-27). These arguments are self defeating as they ii< •? \ddress the 
SUHKMOIII \ ill tin n u i t i h t idateil h. tIn* lailu.iil liiidm^ • ,< '* - K-^Lcr 
received no notice. 
' • - ' 2 0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. The evidence is not legally insufficient to support the 
factual finding of no notice. 
The mother makes a weak attempt in her brief to challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence as follows, "The District Court had this evidence before it, but 
did not consider this evidence in making its ruling... Rather than considering the 
evidence, the District Court did not look at the surrounding circumstances at the 
entry of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order... However, a full review of the 
facts before the Court, the Tribal Court's order did not lack due process because 
Appellee had notice of the Invalidation Petition and had an opportunity to be 
heard on the issues raised therein." (Appellant's Brief, 19). This challenge falls 
short of listing all the facts supporting the findings and then demonstrating the 
evidence is insufficient. 
Despite the mother's disagreement with the trial court's interpretation of 
the evidence, there is sufficient evidence the grandfather received no notice. By 
way of example, the mother confirms no notice in her brief saying, "While, 
ignoring the argument above regarding appropriate notice of the Invalidation 
Petition, Appellee did not have notice that the Tribal Court could enter an order 
accepting jurisdiction and changing custody, pursuant to the May 15, 1998 
Juvenile Court order." (Appellant's Brief, 21-22). The transcript captured the 
mother's several other admissions of no notice: 
The Court: Well, wait a minute. The juvenile court transfers this 
to the tribal court. The tribal court enters its order. Did they ever 
give Boyd Searle any notice so he could be heard before they 
decided to issue the order? 
21 
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Mr. Shirley: Before they issued —the issue of accepting 
jurisdiction? 
The Court: No. Taking custody. 
Mr. Shirk} :: 1 1 ie\ did i tot 1 ia\ e a hearii ig at tl lat tii i le i t,o. 
(T. 8). 
The Court: Well did somebody tell him when they were going to 
have a hearing so he could show up at the tribal court and say, 
"Wait a minute, I don't want to do this?" 
Mr. Shirley: rhey did not have a hearing at the time, \ our Honor. 
However, on June 8th, there was a hearing which involved the 
petitioner. Petitioner, respondent and the tribal court and the 
juvenile court, as well as counsel for the tribe, Mr. Beaudry. 
The Court: I hose being to entoru4 an ord< i iii l\Li\ of 1998? 
Mr Shirley : \ eal i 
The Court: One that was issued without notice to Mr. Searle? 
Mr. Shirley: Yes, your honor. 
(T.8-9). 
****** 
The Court: The tribal court accepts jurisdiction and changes 
custody. 
N lr.! >hirlev: \ es 
The i '< »iirl They didn't give Mr. Searle notice. 
Mr. Shirley: That they intended to take that action, no. 
The Court: Then tell me how you get due process... 
(T. 14). 
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Those admissions were followed by the grandfather's counsel reiterating 
his contentions found in the pleadings: 
Ms. Santana: Because my client was not provided an opportunity 
to be heard, the tribal court then entered an order ex parte upon an 
oral motion made by the tribe, and there was a hearing, despite Mr. 
Shirley's representation that there was no hearing. There was a 
hearing and the only person that was invited was the attorney for 
the tribe. And then they entered an order...[and] transferred 
custody to [the mother]. 
(T. 23). 
After hearing the arguments and reviewing the pleadings, the trial court 
ruled on the evidence: 
The Court: [ ] I'm satisfied that ...the materials that have been 
presented to me here, both in oral argument and with the file, 
indicate that Mr. Searle was given no notice and no opportunity to 
be heard with regard to the orders that were issued by the tribal 
court on May 22,1998. 
(T. 35). 
D. Due Process cannot be satisfied in the absence of notice. 
The mother's argument that due process was afforded despite the absence of 
notice defies legal reasoning because notice is the fundamental element of due 
process. "Questions frequently arise as to the adequacy of a particular form of 
notice in a particular case... But as to the basic requirement of notice itself there 
can be no doubt...." Armstrong v. Nlanzo, 380 U.S. 545,550 (1965) (notice required 
where the judicial proceedings permanently deprived a parent of parental 
rights). "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
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and attord lln n an opp nlni.il', lr ("tvsnit IIUMV obitrtions. Armstrong o. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Mu/ane i?. Centra/ Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 114.; 
Estate of/ones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 983 (Utah 1993); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 I 2d 157 
(I Jtal it. 1 993), ' [ ' \ ] foreigi t. ji ldgn lent i endered i inder circi n nstai ices 1 hat 
amount to lack of due process is not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah." 
Holm, 840 P.2d at 164 (Utah 1993) Data Management Sysytems In, V. EDP 709 
I 2d 377, ;V7^  (ULih 1985) 
1 Ii. nifties a^nv I hat the Tribal Court order, which awarded "temporary 
care, custody and control;'" was final, although they disagree on the reasons for 
finality. (Addendum, 8). *b° mother argues the order is final because the 
grai iiifather failed to app - * * • (Appellant's Brief 25) 11 le grandfather 
argues the order is final because he was directly told during a subsequent 
telephonic conference with the Tribal Court that he had no due process rights in 
their court ami beiausr 111*• s n uiitinucd lo rn ione llhit" iinnpoian nrdn Ii miii^  jftrr 
me underlying action had been dismissed. (T. 23-24). The order was final as to 
the grandfather's rights because of the Tribal Court's unwillingness to allow him 
to meaningfully participate and 1 1 t.e i n iprecedei ited actio t i of ei i forcii ig a 
lUitipotan oidtT from a dismissed case, not because the order itself legitimately 
became final and absolute. 
E, A temporary order from an action that has been dismissed 
is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit. 
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Notwithstanding the obvious unenforceability of an order entered 
without due process, another essential element for enforcement of a foreign 
order is that the order must be accorded finality. Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d at 985, 
(Utah 1993). As explained supra, this order was a temporary order from an 
action already dismissed in the Tribal Court. Consequently, the order was not 
final in any legal sense and was not subject to enforceability in Utah under the 
Estate of Jones standard. 
F. The appeal of the trial court's conclusion that Due Process 
was violated is frivolous because there is no dispute that the 
grandfather was not provided notice. 
Once again, the appeal of this second issue is frivolous under Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as demonstrated by the following 
statement contained in the mother's brief, "Appellant does not dispute that a 
fundamental requirement of due process is notice and an opportunity to be 
heard." (Appellant's Brief, 21). In essence, the mother argues the trial court 
must have committed error in reaching the legal conclusion that the right to due 
process was violated while admitting both that there was no notice and that notice 
is a fundamental element of due process. The argument is not grounded in fact or 
law because the lack of notice and the legal necessity of notice are undisputed. 
Therefore, the mother's insistence that the Appellate Court conclude that due 
process was satisfied in the absence of notice renders the appeal frivolous because 
it is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. The Appellate Court 
should affirm the trial court's ruling and sanction the mother in the amount of 
25 
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attorneys ie«3 ami utsK imunvJ lb1 flu1 I'miultathei in connection with 
responding to this frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
1 he Court \ :)f Appeals shoi Ud disn liss 1 he appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
because the Supreme Court is the proper court 'wherein jurisdiction lay. 
Alternatively, :he merits of the arguments, the Appellate Court must affirm 
the trial o»ui: ^ nnru; ibecause it correctly applied 1 1 i.e la;\ \ ai id zommitted no 
Respectfully submitted thjs/s2" day 
Irra Cristina Santana 
Attorney for Appellee, Boyd Searle 
IT.RTirK' VI'I'.OI'SEK HCF!, 
I hereby certify that on thi£/^> day o T ^ > M , 2000,1 caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by US mail upon: 
Jim C. Shirley 
10 E. Exchange Place, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
&AA^ 
^ 
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ADDENDUM 
i 
27 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78-22-1.1 JUDICIAL CODE 411 
filed and docketed in any court of this state and shall have the 
same force and effect as a judgment entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1,1997, a judgment entered in the small 
claims division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon 
real property unless filed and docketed in accordance with 
Subsection (3). This Subsection (4) shall apply to all small 
claims judgments entered on or after April 27,1992. IWJ 
78-22-1.1, Judgment against party dying after verdict 
or decision* 
A judgment rendered where a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact, and before judgment, is not a 
lien on the real property of the deceased party, but is payable 
in the course of the administration of his estate. ion 
78-22-1*5. Definitions — Judgment recorded in Regis-
try of Judgments. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments* 
means the index where a judgment shall be recorded and 
searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through 
electronic means or by tangible document. 
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment rendered or 
recorded in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect 
the title to real property unless the judgment is recorded in 
the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the 
district court of the county in which the property is located. 
1*97 
78-22-2. Judgment against sheriff — When conclusive 
against sureties on indemnity bond. 
If an action is brought against a sheriff for an act done by 
virtue of his office and he gives written notice thereof to the 
sureties on any bond of indemnity received by him, the 
judgment recovered therein is conclusive evidence of his right 
to recover against such sureties; and the court, or judge in 
vacation, may, on motion, upon notice of five days, order 
judgment to be entered against them for the amount so 
recovered, including costs. 19SS 
78-22-3. J u d g m e n t b y confess ion author ized . 
A judgment by confession may be entered without action, 
either for money due or to become due or to secure any person 
against contingent liability on behalf of the defendant, or both, 
in the manner prescribed by law. Such judgment may be 
entered in any court having jurisdiction for like amounts. 
1963 
78-22-4. Blileage allowance for judgment debtor re-
quired to appear. ' 
Every judgment debtor legally required to appear before a 
district court or a master to answer concerning his, her, or its 
property is entitled, on a sufficient showing of need, to mileage 
of 15 cents per mile for each mile actually and necessarily 
traveled in going only, to be paid by the judgment creditor at 
whose instance the judgment debtor was required to appear, 
but the judgment creditor is not required £o make any pay-
ment for such mileage until the judgment debtor has actually 
appeared before the court or master. iLiiiiiH"*!. 
Section 
78-22a-7. 
78-22a-8. 
Repealed. 
Uniformity of 1111«r j i r«i. HI 11 mi 
CHAPTER 22a f 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
Section -
78-22a*l. Short title. ' 
78-22a-2. Definition — Filing: and status of foreign judg-
ments. 4 * 
78-22a-3. Notice of filing. \ I 
78-22a-4. Stay. .* y 
78-22a-5. Lien. 
78-22a-6. Optional procedure. 
78-22a-l. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Uuk 
Foreign Judgment Act." ua 
78-22a-2* Definition — Filing and •tat'iu of foreip 
judgments. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" meant u j 
judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United State* or a* 
any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit 
in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in i 
dance with an appropriate act of Congress or an appropriiM 
act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any district courts 
Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreip 
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court if 
Utah. 
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter hai tb 
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, detent* 
enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, va-
cating, setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a distria 
court of this state 1M 
78-22a-3. Not i ce of filing. 
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, atlst 
time of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with tat 
clerk of the district court stating the last known post-offia 
address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor. 
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, tk 
clerk of the district court shall notify the judgment debtor that 
the judgment has been filed. Notice shall be sent to tk 
address stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall record the dstt 
the notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice ihil 
include the name and post-office address of the judgmei 
creditor and the name and address of the judgment creditor^  
attorney, if any. 
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of i 
foreign judgment-fiied-tmdeiL|^ chapter may issue until 31 
days afteirfneJudgment is filedT^ in 
78-22a-4. Stay. 
(1) If an appeal from a foreign judgment is pending, tk 
time for appeal has not expired, or a stay of execution hai be* 
granted, the court, upon proof that the judgment debtor BSJ 
furnished security for satisfaction of the judgment in the i t* 
in which the judgment was rendered shall stay enforcement •* 
the judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appal 
expires, or until the stay of execution expires or is vacated. 
(2) If the foreign judgment debtor, upon motion, ahowitk 
district court any ground upon which enforcement of ijudf 
ment of a district court of this state would be stayed, the CMS 
shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment upon tk 
posting of security in the kind and amount required to sUf 
enforcement of a domestic judgment M 
78-22a-5. L ien . 
(1) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter becootfu 
lien as provided in Section 78-22-1 if a stay of execution Is 
not been granted. 
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied, tk 
foreign judgment becomes a lien upon the judgment debMrij 
property on the date it is docketed. 
78-22a-6. Opt ional procedure . 
This chapter shall not be construed to impair a judgnai 
creditor's right to bring an action in this state to enforce adl 
creditor's judgment. Ml 
/ 
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By 
.nird Judicial District 
JUL 2 6 1339 
COUNTY ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ^ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
r 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE: COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE, 
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 980905344 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 8, 
1999 for hearing on petitioner's Petition for Writ of Assistance. 
Jim C. Shirley appeared representing petitioner, Jayni Searle. 
Maria Cristina Santana appeared representing respondent, Boyd 
Searle. Boyd Searle personally appeared. The parties have filed 
extensive pleadings regarding the issues before the Court, the 
parties made their respective arguments. The Court having reviewed 
the file, having properly considered all the oral and written 
arguments submitted to the Court by the parties, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
.• 1 . • ' In F e b r u a r y o f 1 9 9 8 , r e s p o n d e n t l, J. I. eel i n i il il "If h i r d 
District Juvenile Court a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights 
of Jayni Searle :i n relation to chad Searj. . 
2. Subsequently, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for 
Custody obtained mi Ki i i\n il ruder < Temporary Custody on 
March 3# 1998, 
3 . • P e t i t I.'ni,fi f i II c Il r, ill111,-ill 1 1 i "in to Transfer to Tribal Court 
in March - 1998. 
4. The Third District Juvenile Court # Judge Olo 
Johansson, presiding, transferred jurisdictioni "<• | 
Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5. . The Fort Peck Tribal u ill iKrwpl -'i/i J.i I I i Il 
transferred custody of the minor child on May 1998. 
• 6. Boyd searle wa& l l11,1  Vo\'t, peck 
Tribal Court would issue an Order * * issue of custody. 
1 . ' Petit in on lie i f:i I Petition l of Assistance with 
this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May 
22, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Cqurt custody Order. 
#• 
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8. The parties have subsequently filed numerous pleadings 
regarding the appropriateness of the issuance of a Writ of 
Assistance. 
9. Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to give Full 
Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal Court Orders. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The May 22, 1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court 
transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign 
judgment. 
2. As a foreign judgment/ the judgment must be filed in 
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-22a-l, et seq. 
3. The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply with 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
4. Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior to 
the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5. The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be heard 
at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a violation 
of respondent's due process rights. 
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6. As such, the May 22, 1998 Order transferring custody is 
not entitled to full faith and credit. 
7. The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before the 
Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Petition for Writ of Assistance is denied. 
2. The action is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort 
Peck Tribal Court May 22, 1998 Order. 
3. The above-entitled action is dismissed without prejudice 
as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 22, 1998 Order which 
has been entered by the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the dismissal of 
this action in no way precludes subsequent enforcement of 
subsequent Orders through a filing under theyUtah Foreign Judgment 
Act, and which are otherwise enforceable mder law^.***™**^ 
Dated this.£^£_day of July, 1999 J f /$S^rJ\ 
I /TIMOTHY R. HAriSQS-a:'C^ 
'DISTRICT COURT JUf 
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JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100) 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 J 
TELEPHONE: (801)359-8003 * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE ) 
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD ) 
") AMENDED WRIT 
JAYNI SEARLE, ) OF ASSISTANCE 
Petitioner, ) 
VS. ) CaseNn. 980905344 
BOYD SEARLE, ) Judge Timothy R, Hanson 
Respondent. ) 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 
Assistance on the Day of , 1998, Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
presiding. The Court having reviewed the Objection submitted by Respondent, Boyd Searle and 
having reviewed the Response submitted by Petitioner. The Court hereby finds: 
1. Respondent has failed to appropriately raise the due process issues before the tribal court 
in a timely maimer. 
2. More than 30 days have passed since Respondent was placed on notice that Petitioner 
was seeking to enforce the judgment in the State of Utah. 
3. The Court of Appeals having ruled that tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
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No grounds now exist that would prohibit the Court from entering the Writ of Assistance. 
The Court hereby concludes that, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(d) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-22a-l (et. seq.), the order of the tribal court is properly before the court for Domestication. 
Based upon this conclusion, the Court hereby recognizes the Order of the Fort Peck Assiniboine 
» • 
and Sioux Tribal Court, gives it full faith and credit, and domesticates the order. Based upon 
good cause appearing in the record before the Court and in Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of 
Assistance, the Court hereby orders that the Sheriff, Law Enforcement, or Constable to use any 
and all necessary and reasonable means to secure the person of Chad Searle and deliver him to 
Jim C. Shirley at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah for delivery to the natural 
mother. Any and all necessary and reasonable means shall include, but not be limited to, 
entrance upon the premises located at: (1) the residence at 4885 South 3640 West, Keams, Utah; 
(2) the residence at 4906 South 4460 West, Keams, Utah; or (3) Arcadia Elementary at 3461 
West 4850 South, Keams, Utah and execute upon the attached Order. 
DATED THIS DAY OF , 1998. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
HFRTTFTPATF. OF MATTING 
On this _ day of Jgpr^cu^ r . 19981 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, 
a copy of the foregoing Amended Writ of Assistance to: 
Maria Christina Santana * 
Santana Law Firm > 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES 
FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION 
P.O. BOX 1027 
POPLAR, MONTANA 59255 
(406) 768-5557 
State of Utah, Third District Juvenile Court 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, 
A Minor Indian Child 
Order Accepting Jurisdiction 
(Utah case # 948405) 
Upon Motion of Gary M. Beaudry, ICWA Attorney for the Fort Peck Tribes and upon review 
of the court order issued by Judge Olof A. Johansson of the Third District Juvenile Court, Salt 
Lake City County, State Utah, in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and good 
cause appearing this court issues the following: 
Findings 
1. This matter is an Indian Child Welfare Act Proceeding as defined under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 as it pertains to a Termination of Parental Rights;. 
2. The child subject to this proceeding is an Indian Child as defined under the Act and the 
Fort Peck Tribes is the Indian Child's Tribe as defined under the Act; 
3. The State court after due process issued an order transfering jurisdiction of this matter 
to this Tribal court; 
4. This court enjoys jurisdiction exclusive of any state court under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a). 
NOWTHEREFORE it is the order of this court that: 
1. The Fort Peck Tribal Court hereby accept jurisdiction and allow the child to be transported 
from the State of Utah to the Fort Peck Indian Reservation by his Natural Mother, Jayni 
Searle and 
2. That the child shall remain under thejtemporary care, custody and control of his natural 
mother Jayni Searle until further ord<ir of this court. .— j _ 
Issued and dated this 22nd day of May 19*98. ~- 'v—_ /.. 
VA, Attest Clerk of Court Chief Judge, A.T. Stafne 
r 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
